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Sammendrag 
I denne artikkelen estimeres sysselsettingseffekter av førtidspensjonsordningen AFP, slik ordningen 
var fram til 2011. Hovedformålet med artikkelen er å besvare følgende spørsmål: hvor mange 
førtidspensjonister ville ha vært i jobb ved ulike aldre dersom AFP ikke hadde vært en mulig vei ut av 
arbeidsmarkedet? Administrative registerdata danner grunnlaget for den empiriske analysen. I den 
første delen av artikkelen sammenliknes eldre arbeidstakere i bedrifter med og uten AFP-tilknytning. 
Her finner jeg at omtrent 40 prosent av alle AFP-pensjonister ville ha stått i jobb til de nådde “normal” 
pensjonsalder (67) hvis førtidspensjon med AFP ikke hadde vært et alternativ. Med andre ord ville 
over halvparten av alle førtidspensjonister ha trukket seg ut av arbeidsmarkedet uansett, de fleste via 
uførepensjon. Videre sammenlikner jeg to grupper arbeidstakere i AFP-bedrifter som sto overfor ulik 
aldersgrense for AFP. Her finner jeg at så mange som to av tre AFP-pensjonister ville ha jobbet som 
63-åringer dersom aldersgrensen var 64 i stedet for 62. Førtidspensjonsordningen AFP har altså hatt en 
sterk negativ effekt på sysselsettingen blant eldre, samtidig som den har sørget for en mer verdig 
avgang for arbeidstakere som ellers ville ha vært nødt til å basere seg på ordninger som uføretrygd 
eller ledighetstrygd. 
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to investigate the net induced retirement eﬀects of
an early retirement programme in Norway (AFP) in order to answer the follow-
ing question: How many new exits are induced by early retirement programmes?
Over the last decades, the ﬁscal sustainability of public pension systems in most
industrialised countries have been put under heavy pressure due to a combin-
ation of increased longevity and lower age at retirement, the latter probably
driven to a large extent by early retirement schemes. Although the trend to-
wards early retirement now appears to have come to an end, life expectancy is
still increasing, and more so than average age at retirement. Encouraging longer
working lives is therefore one of the main pillars of recent policy advice from
the OECD (see e.g. OECD (2011)), and reforms aimed at increasing the age at
retirement are looming in most Western countries. With this need for reforms,
the need for solid knowledge about the labour supply responses to changes in
early retirement schemes is intensiﬁed.
Many countries have programmes or institutions allowing diﬀerent groups
of workers to permanently retire prior to the normal retirement age. Public
pension systems often operate with both an early retirement age and a nor-
mal retirement age, and unemployment and disability insurance programmes
sometimes provide preferential treatment for elderly workers. While such pro-
grammes are eﬀective in insuring workers against productivity shocks occurring
at late stages of the career, the fact that shocks to individual productivity are
unveriﬁable to the insurer might create moral hazard problems eﬃciency losses.
The success of early retirement programmes therefore hinges on the magnitude
of induced retirement eﬀects, or the extent to which workers are induced to
retire early even if they are not hit by negative productivity shocks.
When evaluating the eﬀects of programmes connected to the labour market,
the main challenge lies in the non-observabililty of counterfactual outcomes,
or the simple fact that we do not know how workers would have behaved had
the programme not been in operation. In this particular setting, the aim is
to estimate net induced retirement eﬀects of an early retirement programme,
taking account of any substitution from other informal exit routes, such as
disability or unemployment, that are known to play roles similar to that of early
retirement programmes in many countries (see e.g. Gruber andWise (1999)). To
obtain estimates with causal interpretations I will be exploiting two potentially
exogenous sources of variation in individual eligibility for early retirement in
order to deﬁne treatment and comparison group workers, and take the observed
outcomes of comparison group workers as an approximation to the unobserved
counterfactual outcomes of treatment group workers.
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The early retirement programme AFP (hereafter simply referred to as ER)
was phased in during the nineties in terms of step-wise reductions of the lower
age limit, from 66 to 62. For a worker to be qualiﬁed for retirement prior to
the normal retirement age of 67 she must meet a set of individual eligibility
criteria and be employed by an ER aﬃliated ﬁrm. The fact that not all ﬁrms
are aﬃliated with the ER programme represents a ﬁrst source of potentially
exogenous variation in retirement opportunities: Using samples of workers fa-
cing the same lower age limit for ER I obtain average treatment eﬀects of ER
aﬃliation on labour market outcomes at diﬀerent ages. These will have a causal
interpretation provided that ﬁrm level aﬃliation is as good as random from each
worker’s point of view, conditional on a set of observable characteristics. The
results from this part indicate that close to 40% of all ER pensioners would still
be working at the age of 66.5 had early retirement not been an option; a rather
substantial labour supply response, given the age for which the treatment eﬀect
is estimated. On the other hand, a majority of ER pensioners would have left
the labour market at this age regardless of the ER programme, typically relying
on disability insurance beneﬁts. However, there are indications that the identi-
fying assumption for this ﬁrst strategy might not be satisﬁed, despite the rich
set of ﬁrm and worker characteristics contained in the data.
A second set of identiﬁcation strategies exploits a diﬀerence in the lower
age limit between two diﬀerent birth cohorts as a source of exogenous variation
in individual eligibility for ER. One approach restricts attention to workers in
aﬃliated ﬁrms and relies on observed labour market outcomes at each age being
inﬂuenced by year of birth only through the lower age limit. Another approach
is one in which the identifying assumption instead is related to changes over
time in labour market outcomes, and where the observed outcomes of workers
in non-aﬃliated ﬁrms are being used to take account for possible contamination
due to diﬀerent labour market conditions for the two cohorts. This gives robust
triple diﬀerence average treatment eﬀects indicating that as many as two out
of three ER pensioners would still be working at the age of 63 had the lower
age limit been 64 rather than 62. At this age there is only relatively modest
substitution from other exit routes.
The most important general insights from this papers may be summarised
in two points. First, the sizable labour supply eﬀects of the ER programme
clearly suggest that economic incentives have a central role in determining the
timing of retirement. On the other hand, the non-negligible beneﬁt substitution
eﬀects indicate that mechanisms other than economic incentives are also playing
important roles in pushing or pulling elderly workers out of the labour market.
The fact that the lion’s share of the substitution is from disability pension
beneﬁts suggests that the most important shocks against which elderly workers
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need insurance are health related.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews some related literature
before a brief history of the ER programme and its main features is given in
Section 3. Section 4 describes the data and the constructed samples of elderly
workers. Section 5 spells out the main econometric framework and employs this
to investigate the induced retirement eﬀects of the early retirement programme
and substitution eﬀects from other exit routes and into early retirement, for two
cohorts of workers faced with diﬀerent lower age limits. In Section 6 the focus is
on estimating the eﬀects of reducing the lower age limit from 64 to 62 on labour
market outcomes at age 63. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
The evidence on labour supply eﬀects of ER provision in the existing literature
is rather mixed. Baker and Benjamin (1999) ﬁnd that ER reforms in Canada
led to a marked increase in pension receipt, but had little eﬀect on labour sup-
ply. The ﬁndings suggest that the new recipients were loosely attached to the
labour market and would therefore not have worked even without having ac-
cess to ER pension beneﬁts. On the other hand, both Staubli and Zweimu¨ller
(2012) and Manoli and Weber (2012) document positive and non-negligible la-
bour supply eﬀects of increased early retirement age in Austria. Staubli and
Zweimu¨ller report that between 30 and 40 percent of all workers who retire
later do prolong their employment, but there is also substantial substitution to
unemployment insurance beneﬁts. Neither of the two studies ﬁnd evidence of
signiﬁcant substitution to disability pensions.
The early retirement programme AFP has existed for more than three dec-
ades and its eﬀects have been assessed in several studies. Two studies in which
the quasi-natural experiment property of the programme plays an important
role are Røed and Haugen (2003) and Bratberg, Holma˚s, and Thøgersen (2004).
Røed and Haugen ﬁnd that two out of three pensioners would have stayed em-
ployed had early retirement not been an option, and that the programme does
not substitute for disability pensions or long-term unemployment. In contrast,
Bratberg et al. ﬁnd that at least half the ER pensioners would have stayed in
the labour force without the scheme, but also that substitution from other exit
routes is quite substantial. This latter ﬁnding stands in clear contrast to the
absence of such substitution eﬀects reported by Røed and Haugen. The two
analyses are based on the same types of data covering overlapping time peri-
ods, but a major diﬀerence is that Røed and Haugen include both public and
private sector workers in their sample, whereas Bratberg et al. restrict attention
to the private sector. The fact that workers in the two sectors are widely dif-
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ferent in many relevant aspects, including personal characteristics, retirement
options, and observed retirement behaviour, may well explain large parts of the
discrepancies in terms of estimated substitution eﬀects.1
Other related studies include Karlstro¨m, Palme, and Svensson (2008), Mas-
trobuoni (2009), Kyyra¨ (2010) and Inderbitzin, Staubli, and Zweimu¨ller (2012).
Karlstro¨m et al. employ a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy to study the eﬀects
of an abolition of special eligibility rules for a Swedish disability insurance pro-
gramme aﬀecting workers in the age bracket 60-64. Prior to the reform in 1997
the Swedish programme was similar to AFP in several aspects, with medical
requirements being part of the eligibility rules as a notable exception. The em-
pirical results give no support for the intended increases in employment, but
there are indications of increased utilisation of unemployment and sickness in-
surance beneﬁts. Kyyra¨ (2010) focuses mostly on disability pensions, but eﬀects
of an early retirement programme are identiﬁed by exploiting diﬀerent lower age
limits for private and public sector workers. If the observed diﬀerences between
workers in the two sectors are indicative of systematic diﬀerences also in terms
of unobservable characteristics, any causal interpretation of results based on
such an identiﬁcation strategy might be questionable.
Mastrobuoni (2009) studies the eﬀects of beneﬁt cuts driven by increased
normal retirement age on retirement behaviour in the US, and ﬁnds that the
mean retirement age of the aﬀected cohorts increased by half as much as the
increase in retirement age. Finally, Inderbitzin et al. (2012) study how extended
unemployment insurance beneﬁts for older workers in Austria aﬀect the incid-
ence of ER and other labour market exit routes. They ﬁnd that the reform
led to a dramatic increase in the incidence of ER, and also that the relatively
young responded by sequential take-up of unemployment and disability insur-
ance beneﬁts, while older workers had a tendency to substitute from disability
to unemployment insurance beneﬁts.
This contribution adds to the existing literature in the following ways: First,
a clear distinction between diﬀerent exit routes is possible due to detailed re-
gister data covering the full population of Norway. Second, the combination
of these data and an exogenous policy change enables identiﬁcation of policy
relevant causal eﬀects of early retirement programmes that are not readily avail-
able in other settings. The paper extends the literature on this particular ER
programme by covering a relatively long time period (1993–2003) and charac-
terising the full paths towards retirement for several groups of elderly workers;
public sector workers and private sector workers in aﬃliated and non-aﬃliated
1Another contribution is Hernæs, Sollie, and Strøm (2000); they ﬁnd that although ﬁnancial
incentives do inﬂuence retirement behaviour, a rather generous bonus is needed in order to
make eligible individuals postpone retirement by one year.
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ﬁrms. Importantly, the analyses are performed separately for public and private
sector workers.
3 Institutional setting
AFP (AvtaleFestet Pensjonsordning) is a subsidized voluntary early retirement
scheme that was introduced January 1 1989 as a result of the central tariﬀ
negotiations in 1988. The scheme started out with a lower age limit at 66 years,
which was reduced to 65 from January 1 1990, to 64 from October 1 1993, to 63
from October 1 1997, and ﬁnally to 62 years from March 1 1998. In the public
pension scheme the retirement age is 67, and prior to 1989 there were no purely
voluntary early retirement options available to workers below this age. Possible
quasi-voluntary or informal exit routes were unemployment, sickness leave and
disability pensions. These were claimed to be associated with social stigma, and
the need for a more digniﬁed exit from the workforce for early leavers was one
of the arguments in favour of AFP. Another argument was that a new early
retirement scheme was needed to make room for younger people in the labour
market.2
The ER scheme is fairly generous3, as the pension level received is the same
as it would be had the person continued working until the age of 67 in the job she
held just prior to retirement. In addition comes a subsidy of 950 NOK/month
during the early retirement years, and when an ER pensioner reaches the age
of 67 she will receive a public pension which is calculated as if she had been
working until that age. The full costs are borne by the participating employers
for pensioners below the age of 64, by means of a fund ﬁnanced by fees per
employee varying according to hours worked (three categories), whereas the
government covers 40% of the costs for those of age 64 to 67.
While the public pension scheme provides universal coverage, the ER scheme
covers the public sector and about half the employees in the private sector,
namely those employed in ﬁrms taking part in the central tariﬀ agreements. In
addition to ﬁrm aﬃliation there are also some rather weak requirements related
to individual work histories4.
2This view is widely criticised amongst economists and is often referred to as the “lump
of labour” fallacy, as it relies on the seemingly fallible view that the economy runs on a ﬁxed
amount of labour. The argument has also found little empirical support, see e.g. Gruber and
Wise (2010).
3Røed and Haugen (2003) ﬁnd that average replacement rates, net of taxes, for ER pension
beneﬁts, disability pension beneﬁts and unemployment beneﬁts are 72, 64 and 62 percent,
respectively. Sickness leave is another informal exit route which gives a beneﬁt replacement
rate of 100 percent, but for a maximal duration of 12 months.
4The individual requirements are (i) at least 10 years of work experience (earnings exceeding
1 Basic Amount (BA)) since the age of 50, (ii) the average of the 10 highest yearly incomes
since 1967 must exceed 2BA, (iii) current employment, and (annualized) earnings at least
equal to 1BA in the year of retirement and the year before, and iv) at least 3 years of tenure
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4 Data, sample and descriptive statistics
The data used in this paper combines several administrative registers obtained
from Statistics Norway. One is the Register of Employers and Employees, which
covers the entire Norwegian working age population over the period 1992-2009
and gives both ﬁrm and individual speciﬁc information for all job spells. The
data contains demographic information for all residents, identiﬁes recipients of
ER and disability pensions, sick leave beneﬁts and unemployment beneﬁts, and
includes individual earnings data (in terms of pension points) dating back to
1967.
The main sample consists of two cohorts, or sub-samples, faced with diﬀerent
age limits: (i. Age limit 64) individuals born between January 1 and May 31
1933 (turned 60 in 1993 (base year)), and (ii. Age limit 62) individuals born
between January 1 and May 31 1937 (turned 60 in 1997 (base year)). Hence,
individuals in cohort (i) turned 64 just before the age limit was lowered to 63,
while individuals in cohort (ii) turned 62 shortly after the age limit was set to
62. Figure 1 illustrates the sampling; how it relates to the reductions in the
lower age limit for ER, and how diﬀerent age limits have applied to diﬀerent
groups of workers over time.
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Figure 1: Lower age limits for the for workers in aﬃliated and non-aﬃliated ﬁrms.
Green (brown) vertical lines indicate when workers in the “old” (“young”) cohort
turned 64 (62).
Private and public sector workers who met the following two ER eligibility
in the present ﬁrm. The Basic Amount is frequently referred to as G, and is a central feature
of the public pension system in Norway. It is adjusted every year, with a nominal rate of
growth varying between 2 and 14% since its introduction in 1967. The average BA for 2012
is 81,153 NOK, which at the time of writing corresponds to about 10,800 EUR or 8,700 GBP.
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criteria the year they turned 60 (at the latest) are included in the sample: (a) At
least 10 years of work experience (i.e. earnings exceeding 1BA5) since the age of
50, and (b) the average of the 10 highest yearly incomes since 1967 above 2BA.
We also require tenure in the base year ﬁrm at least from the age of 59, so that
all individuals would have the opportunity to take out ER pensions the month
after they turned 62 had the lower age limit been 62, which it was for one of the
two sub-samples.6 The ﬁnal requirement is that individuals lived through their
67th birthday. Based on information from the month after they turned 61, 61.5,
62, 62.5, . . . , 66, 66.5, all individuals in the sample are classiﬁed into one of seven
labour force states: Work, part-time work and ER beneﬁts7, ER, disability, long
term sick leave, unemployment, and ’other’. Details regarding the classiﬁcation
of individuals into labour force states are provided in the Appendix.
Descriptive statistics for each of the two sub-samples are given in Table 1
and 2, along with observed labour market outcomes at the age of 66.5. Workers
are divided into three groups according to the ER aﬃliation of the ﬁrm for
which they were working at the age of 60; ER-aﬃliated private sector ﬁrms, non-
aﬃliated private sector ﬁrms, and public sector ﬁrms.8 The fraction of males, the
fraction of full-time workers and the average number of days on sick leave (during
1992/1996) is higher among workers in ER aﬃliated ﬁrms than among the non-
aﬃliated, and lowest in the public sector, while the incidence of unemployment
(in 1992/1996) is clearly lowest for workers in the public sector, followed by those
in aﬃliated private ﬁrms. There is also a marked diﬀerence in the distribution
across industries: The fraction of workers in Manufacturing is higher and the
fraction of workers in the Retail, Finance and Service industries lower among
aﬃliated ﬁrms than among non-aﬃliated ﬁrms, while public sector ﬁrms are
concentrated in the Service and Transport industries. Aﬃliated ﬁrms and public
sector ﬁrms are also considerably bigger in terms of number of employees than
the non-aﬃliated private sector ﬁrms.
As for the observed outcomes at age 66.5, relatively few of the workers in ER
aﬃliated ﬁrms were still working, but we also note that the fractions of workers
on disability and on sick leave are lower for aﬃliated than for non-aﬃliated ﬁrms.
About eight percent of the workers in non-aﬃliated ﬁrms are classiﬁed into the
states ’ER’ and ’part-time work and ER beneﬁts’. This may be explained either
by (i) people changing jobs after the age of 60, as only three years of tenure are
5See footnote 4.
6The conditioning on individual eligibility criteria is imposed in order to avoid selection
biases arising from the fact that workers staisfying these criteria are likely to be more closely
attached to the labour market than those who do not. Given the requirement of employment
at the age of 60, however, only 6% of the workers fail to satisfy one or more of the criteria.
7Combinations of part-time work and receipt of ER pension beneﬁts (phased retirement)
were allowed from October 1 1997.
8Details regarding the procedure used to identify each ﬁrm’s aﬃliation with the ER scheme
are provided in the Appendix.
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required for ER beneﬁts take-up, or (ii) mis-classiﬁcations; “wrong” main job at
the age of 60 or ﬁrms being classiﬁed as non-aﬃliated while in reality they were
aﬃliated.9 We will return to this issue in the discussion of estimation results
below.
The two tables also reveal some notable diﬀerences between the two birth
cohorts: Unemployment is more common for the older than for the younger
cohort, both when measured during the year prior to the base year and when
measured at the age of 66.5. Workers in the younger cohort are more educated,
they are more likely to be working in the Retail industry and less likely to be
working in Manufacturing, and they are more likely to be living in Eastern
Norway than are workers in the older cohort. Finally, the relative frequencies
of ER pensioners is markedly higher for the younger cohort, at the same time
as combining work and ER beneﬁts appears to have become more common over
time (this comes as no big surprise, however, since such combinations were only
possible as of October 1997).
Figure 2 and 3 show how relative frequencies of individuals in the diﬀerent
labour force states change as individuals grow older, for the sample with age
limit 64 and 62, respectively. More than 80 percent are still working at the age
of 61, but the fraction still working declines steadily for all groups. For workers
in ER-aﬃliated private and public sector ﬁrms, the fraction still working drops
when they reach the lower age limit, at the same time as there is a marked
increase in the fractions on ER pensions. This phenomenon is observed in many
countries and commonly referred to as “spikes” in beneﬁt receipt and retirement
propensities at the age at which beneﬁt eligibility begins10. Otherwise the trends
appear to be fairly similar across the diﬀerent groups of workers.
5 The eﬀects of having access to an early retire-
ment programme
5.1 Econometric model
The point of departure for the econometric analyses is an investigation of the
induced retirement eﬀects of ER for two cohorts of workers faced with diﬀerent
lower age limits. Each worker’s treatment status is in this section determined
by her employer’s aﬃliation with the ER programme. Let K1 and K0 denote
9Labour market mobility for elderly workers is generally found to be rather low, meaning
that the ﬁrst possible explanation is not likely to be the most important of the two. For a
sample of workers who became eligible in 1997, Røed and Haugen (2003) found job changes
3-4 years prior to ER eligibility to be extremely rare.
10See inter alia Rust and Phelan (1997), Baker and Benjamin (1999), Gruber and Wise
(2004), Behaghel and Blau (2012) and Manoli and Weber (2012).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, sample with age limit 64
Private sector Public
ER-aﬃliated Non-aﬃliated
Pension points 1993 4.4 (1.48) 4.0 (1.78) 3.9 (1.50)
Experiencea 25.5 (3.25) 24.4 (4.16) 23.9 (4.42)
Days on sick leaveb 12.0 (34.3) 10.8 (32.9) 9.0 (27.4)
Unemployed 1992c 4.3 (75) 4.0 (60) 0.4 (11)
Male 73.0 (1263) 58.9 (876) 44.7 (1371)
Married 81.2 (1407) 80.5 (1198) 78.7 (2416)
Hours/week ≥ 30 87.1 (1508) 75.4 (1122) 69.2 (2124)
Education
Low 68.6 (1188) 63.4 (943) 53.4 (1638)
Intermediate 26.3 (455) 28.5 (424) 26.0 (798)
High 5.1 (89) 8.1 (121) 20.6 (632)
Firm size (no. of employees)
< 10 4.4 (77) 52.8 (786) 1.0 (30)
10-49 16.6 (288) 27.9 (415) 4.4 (35)
50-99 10.5 (181) 7.5 (111) 5.7 (175)
100-499 31.0 (537) 7.0 (104) 30.9 (949)
≥ 500 37.5 (649) 4.8 (72) 58.0 (1779)
Industry
(1) Agriculture/ﬁsheries 0.6 (11) 3.5 (52) 0.1 (3)
(2) Petrol 3.3 (58) 0.5 (7) 0.0 (0)
(3) Manufacturing 57.0 (987) 16.1 (240) 1.0 (29)
(4) Elecricity/gas/water 0.2 (4) 1.3 (19) 2.9 (90)
(5) Construction 5.2 (91) 6.0 (89) 4.1 (27)
(6) Retail 15.9 (276) 35.2 (523) 1.0 (29)
(7) Transport 6.0 (104) 8.6 (128) 11.3 (347)
(8) Finance 7.6 (131) 13.8 (205) 0.8 (25)
(9) Service 4.0 (70) 15.1 (25) 78.8 (2418)
Regions
(1) East 37.4 (647) 40.3 (600) 35.8 (1099)
(2) Center 12.6 (219) 12.4 (184) 15.2 (465)
(3) South/West 44.2 (766) 40.9 (608) 38.8 (1191)
(4) North 5.8 (100) 6.4 (96) 10.2 (313)
Outcomes at age 66 1
2
Work 11.3 (196) 34.7 (517) 16.7 (512)
ER 46.0 (797) 8.4 (125) 33.7 (1034)
Work and ER 3.4 (59) 0.8 (12) 4.5 (137)
Disability 20.0 (347) 28.4 (422) 24.0 (737)
Sick leave 2.3 (40) 4.6 (68) 1.9 (58)
Unemployment 8.1 (140) 8.1 (120) 0.4 (11)
Other 8.8 (153) 15.0 (224) 18.9 (579)
N 1732 1488 3068
The table reports means (percentages) for continuous (discrete) variables. Standard
deviations (frequencies) in parentheses.
a Number of years with income > 1BA (after 1967).
b Number of days during 1992.
c = 1 if unemployed at some point during 1992.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics, sample with age limit 62
Private sector Public
ER-aﬃliated Non-aﬃliated
Pension points 1997 4.6 (1.40) 4.3 (1.76) 4.0 (1.46)
Experiencea 27.9 (4.16) 26.7 (5.05) 25.9 (5.23)
Days on sick leaveb 11.9 (32.6) 10.8 (32.9) 10.0 (30.8)
Unemployed 1996c 2.7 (60) 2.1 (28) 0.5 (17)
Male 70.2 (1563) 60.5 (801) 41.4 (1317)
Married 78.6 (1748) 80.1 (1060) 76.1 (2421)
Hours/week ≥ 30 88.4 (1967) 76.3 (1009) 72.1 (2294)
Education
Low 63.2 (1407) 59.4 (786) 49.0 (1561)
Intermediate 30.4 (676) 30.8 (407) 23.8 (758)
High 6.4 (142) 9.8 (130) 27.1 (864)
Firm size (no. of employees)
< 10 5.3 (117) 59.2 (783) 0.8 (27)
10-49 17.1 (381) 26.3 (348) 4.0 (127)
50-99 11.7 (260) 4.4 (58) 4.6 (147)
100-499 30.7 (683) 6.5 (86) 28.9 (919)
≥ 500 35.2 (784) 3.6 (48) 61.7 (1963)
Industry
(1) Agriculture/ﬁsheries 1.1 (25) 2.0 (27) 0.4 (14)
(2) Petrol 3.6 (81) 0.8 (10) 0.0 (0)
(3) Manufacturing 48.6 (1082) 11.3 (150) 0.7 (21)
(4) Elecricity/gas/water 0.5 (12) 1.0 (13) 2.5 (78)
(5) Construction 5.4 (121) 6.1 (81) 3.3 (106)
(6) Retail 18.8 (418) 37.5 (496) 1.2 (39)
(7) Transport 7.1 (158) 7.9 (104) 6.6 (211)
(8) Finance 7.4 (165) 7.1 (94) 0.5 (16)
(9) Service 7.3 (163) 26.3 (348) 84.8 (2698)
Regions
(1) East 49.5 (1102) 48.3 (639) 43.4 (381)
(2) Center 9.7 (215) 10.4 (137) 13.4 (425)
(3) South/West 35.3 (785) 36.0 (476) 32.8 (1045)
(4) North 5.5 (123) 5.4 (71) 10.4 (332)
Outcomes at age 66 1
2
Work 8.9 (199) 33.6 (444) 14.4 (459)
ER 60.7 (1351) 6.6 (88) 42.7 (1358)
Work and ER 5.2 (115) 1.6 (21) 10.2 (326)
Disability 16.5 (366) 31.0 (410) 22.1 (704)
Sick leave 1.3 (29) 5.9 (78) 2.1 (68)
Unemployment 0.8 (17) 4.6 (61) 0.2 (7)
Other 6.6 (148) 16.7 (221) 8.2 (261)
N 2225 1323 3183
The table reports means (percentages) for continuous (discrete) variables. Standard
deviations (frequencies) in parentheses.
a Number of years with income > 1BA (after 1967).
b Number of days during 1996.
c = 1 if unemployed at some point during 1996.
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Figure 2: Observed relative frequencies at diﬀerent ages, age limit 64.
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the sets of potential outcomes for individuals with and without an ER entitle-
ment: K1 = {work, work and ER, ER, disabled, sick, unemployed, other} for an
individual with ER entitlement, and K0 = {work, disabled, sick, unemployed,
other} for an individual without ER entitlement. Deﬁne two sets of dummies
Y k1it, Y
k
0it such that Y
k
1it = 1 if an entitled individual i’s outcome is k ∈ K1 at age
t and 0 otherwise, and Y k0it is deﬁned accordingly for non-entitled individuals.
E(Y ksit) = Pr
(
Y ksit = 1
) ≡ P ksit, s = 0, 1 is then the relative frequency of indi-
viduals in state k ∈ Ks with eligibility status s. Let Di be an indicator taking
the value 1 if individual i is entitled to ER (works in an ER aﬃliated ﬁrm) and
0 otherwise, and assume that the selection into aﬃliated ﬁrms may be described
by a utility function V :
Vi = μv(Zi) + uvi, Di =  {Vi > 0}, (1)
where Zi and uvi are observed and unobserved factors determining choices, and
 {·} is the indicator function. Write potential outcomes in terms of observed
(Xi) and unobserved outcome-speciﬁc variables:
Y k1it =X
′
iβ
j + γkt + u
k
1it (2)
Y k0it =X
′
iβ
k + uk0it (3)
γkt is the treatment eﬀect, that is, the eﬀect of ER aﬃliation on the propensity to
be in state k at age t, assumed to be constant across individuals. We normalize
the unobserved variables uvi, u
k
1it and u
k
0it to have zero means and follow the
common practice of imposing additive separability between observed and un-
observed variables. We also assume that all observed variables are exogenous.
If
Y k1it, Y
k
0it ⊥ Di ∀t, (4)
that is, if potential outcomes at all ages are independent of the individual’s
treatment status, then the OLS estimator ˆˆγkt = Y¯
k
1t − Y¯ k0t from the regression
Y kit = α
k + γkt Di + ε
k
it (5)
is an unbiased estimator of the average treatment eﬀect, ATE, i.e. the average
eﬀect of ER-aﬃliation on the propensity to choose outcome j at age t. We will
refer to ˆˆγkt as the ATE under no selection.
Assumption (4) holds whenever D is as good as randomly assigned, but is
likely to be violated in our case, as workers are not distributed randomly across
ﬁrms. When (4) fails to hold true one has to consider alternative identiﬁcation
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strategies. One is known as the conditional independence assumption;
(Y k1it, Y
k
0it) ⊥ Di|Wi ∀t, (CIA)
whereW = (X,Z) is the conditioning set. We will from here on assume that the
sets X and Z are the same, and refer to the set X as the full set of observable
covariates. Under the CIA, the OLS estimator γˆkt from the regression
Y kit = X
′
iβ
k + γkt Di + ε
k
it (6)
is an unbiased and consistent estimator of the ATE. γˆkt will be referred to as
the ATE under selection on observables.
In this setting, assuming conditional independence is equivalent to assum-
ing that conditional on a set of observed covariates, ER aﬃliation is as good
as randomly assigned from the point of view of the workers. This assump-
tion is untestable, but Røed and Haugen (2003) point out two assumptions
that are both necessary for the CIA to hold. First, one needs to assume that
workers do not self-select into aﬃliated ﬁrms as part of an early retirement
strategy. Using the same sources of data as in this paper, but diﬀerent samples
of workers, Røed and Haugen ﬁnd no indications of this type of strategic be-
havior among elderly workers. Secondly, the CIA rules out any systematic
unobserved diﬀerences between workers in aﬃliated and non-aﬃliated ﬁrms,
that is, Cov(uk1t, uv) = 0 and Cov(u
k
0t, uv) = 0 ∀k, t. Non-aﬃliated ﬁrms are
ﬁrms that do not take part in the central tariﬀ agreements, and are typically
smaller and operate in diﬀerent industries than aﬃliated ﬁrms (see Table 1 and
2 above). Given that the ﬁrms are diﬀerent, one may also suspect that the
jobs and the workers occupying the jobs are diﬀerent across aﬃliated and non-
aﬃliated ﬁrms, even in terms of unobservables. Røed and Haugen compare the
retirement behavior of non-eligible workers in aﬃliated and non-aﬃliated ﬁrms,
and ﬁnd that workers in aﬃliated ﬁrms do have a higher voluntary retirement
propensity and a higher disability propensity than those in non-aﬃliated ﬁrms,
even when they are not eligible for ER. They claim nevertheless that these dif-
ferences are fully accounted for by observed explanatory variables, and argue
that having variables reﬂecting ﬁrm size and industry as part of the conditioning
set is of fundamental importance.
5.2 Results
ATEs from OLS on equation (5) are depicted in Figure 4 for private sector
workers with age limit 64 and in Figure 5 for private sector workers with age
limit 62, for the outcomes ’work’, ’disability’, ’sickness leave’, ’unemployment’,
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and ’other’. Starting with the sample with age limit 64, there are no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the propensity to be in the state ’work’ between the aﬃliated and
the non-aﬃliated until the lower age limit is reached. From then on the dif-
ference is around -20 percentage points at each age. The pattern is similar for
the state ’sickness leave’, but with more moderate diﬀerences; they are signiﬁc-
antly negative from age 64.5, and fairly stable at around -3 percentage points.
Workers in aﬃliated ﬁrms were more likely than those in non-aﬃliated ﬁrms
to receive unemployment beneﬁts, from age 62 until age 64.5. For the states
’disability’ and ’other’ the diﬀerences are increasingly negative from the age at
which the lower age limit is reached. Hence, judging from the pre-treatment
trends in Figure 4, non-aﬃliated workers should provide a good approximation
to the counterfactual behaviour of aﬃliated workers for all outcomes except
’unemployment’ and ’other’. We note that individuals working in large manu-
facturing ﬁrms at the age of 60 make a large share of the unemployed, and large
manufacturing ﬁrms are also over-represented among the ER-aﬃliated ﬁrms.
Turning to the sample with age limit 62, we observe that aﬃliated workers
start oﬀ with a somewhat higher propensity to be in the state ’work’ before the
diﬀerence drops about the same way as for those with age limit 64 once they
reach the lower age limit. The pattern is once again similar for the state ’sickness
leave’, with diﬀerences around -4 percentage points. For ’disability’ and ’other’
we observe the same falling tendency as for the sample with age limit 64, and
we note that aﬃliated workers are signiﬁcantly less likely to be in the state
’unemployment’ from the age of 62.5. For this cohort, non-aﬃliated workers
should make a good comparison group for aﬃliated workers for all outcomes
except the outcome ’other’.
Table 3 and 4 show observed outcomes at age 63 and 66.5 for the two cohorts,
and give two sets of estimated diﬀerences: ATEs under no selection and ATEs
under selection on observables. The covariates in X are years of experience,
days on sick leave during 1992/1996, a dummy for receipt of unemployment
beneﬁts in 1992/1996, and dummies for full time work, educational attainment,
gender, industry, geographical location and ﬁrm size (1993/1997). Starting with
Panel I of Table 3, the ATEs under no selection are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero only for the outcomes ’unemployment’ and ’other’ (this was also clear from
Figure 4), but there are, however, substantial diﬀerences between the ATEs
under no selection and the ATEs under selection on observables, especially for
the outcomes ’work’ and ’unemployment’.
Turning to the outcomes at age 66.5 (Panel II), we ﬁrst note that the mag-
nitude of the estimated treatment eﬀect for the outcome ’work’ is reduced by
more than 40 percent when the full set of controls is added, and the two conﬁd-
ence intervals are non-overlapping. For the outcome ’other’, the treatment eﬀect
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more than doubles, and the total substitution eﬀect11 increases by 65 percent,
from -16.8 to -27.8 percentage points. While the ATE under no selection in-
dicates that more than half (23.4/46) the ER pensioners would still be working
at the age of 66.5 if ER was not an option, one would say less than one third
(13.9/46) based on the ATE under selection on observables.
The marked diﬀerences between the two sets of average treatment eﬀects
may be taken as a call for caution when it comes to making causal judgments
based on comparisons between workers in aﬃliated and non-aﬃliated ﬁrms,
especially since there are notable diﬀerences at age 63, one year before the
cohort reaches the lower age limit for ER. As can be seen in Table 1 and 2,
the two groups are clearly diﬀerent in terms of observable characteristics, and
hence there may also be systematic diﬀerences in terms of unobservables that
are not fully accounted for by the set of control variables. The covariates that
alter the average treatment eﬀects the most are the dummies for industry and
ﬁrm size. Firm size is positively related to ER aﬃliation (Table 1 and 2), to the
probability of having an occupational pension (cf. Hernæs et al. (2011)), and
possibly also to the probability of having ﬁrm provided early retirement options
other than AFP. It may also be that workers in larger ﬁrms are diﬀerent in
terms of unobserved personal traits compared to those in small or medium sized
ﬁrms.
The diﬀerences between two sets of average treatment eﬀects are much less
pronounced for the cohort with age limit 62, and all conﬁdence intervals but
two are overlapping (Table 4). The total substitution eﬀects of Panel II are
about twice those of Panel I, and this diﬀerence is largely due to an inﬂow of
non-aﬃliated workers into the states ’disability’ and ’other’. At the age of 66.5,
the substitution from the four states ’disability’, ’sick leave’, ’unemployment’
and ’other’ now adds up to -34 percentage points, and the ATE under selection
on observables indicates that about one third (19.5/60.7) of the ER pensioners
would be working in the absence of the ER programme. The relative magnitudes
of the eﬀect of ER aﬃliation on the propensity to be working at the age of 66.5
are thus about the same for the two sub-samples, and so is the total substitution
from other exit routes.
We have seen that about eight percent of the workers classiﬁed as non-
aﬃliated at the age of 60 were receiving ER pensions at the age of 66.5. This
mis-classiﬁcation will cause the estimated average treatment eﬀects to be biased
downwards in magnitude (see e.g. Hausman (2001)) and is sometimes referred to
as “contamination bias” (see Bratsberg, Fevang, and Røed (2010)). Assuming
11What is from here and onwards referred to as the ’total substitution eﬀect’ is simply the
sum of the estimated average treatment eﬀects of AFP on the outcomes Disability, Sickness
leave, Unemployment and Other.
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that all workers classiﬁed as aﬃliated were indeed aﬃliated and that the take-
up rate of ER pension beneﬁts is the same regardless of how the workers are
classiﬁed in this paper, we compute that 18.6 percent (9.2/0.494) of the non-
aﬃliated workers in the older sub-sample were actually eligible for ER at the
age of 66.5, and so were 12 percent (8.2/0.659) of the non-aﬃliated workers in
the younger sub-sample. We may adjust for contamination bias by dividing the
estimated average treatment eﬀects by the estimated fraction of non-aﬃliated
workers: For the birth cohort with age limit 64 the adjusted eﬀect of ER on the
propensity to be working at the age of 66.5 is calculated as −13.9/(1−0.186) =
−17.1. For the cohort with age limit 62 the adjusted eﬀect is−19.5/(1−0.124) =
−22.3. From these adjusted estimates it follows that nearly 40 percent of all
ER pensioners would still be working at the age of 66.5 had early retirement
not been an option.
Table 3: ATEs of ER aﬃliation for private sector workers with age limit 64
Observed (%) ATEs under ATEs under
ER No ER no selection selection on observablesa
I. Age 63
Work 65.1 66.7 -1.6 [-4.9, 1.7] 7.2 [2.8, 11.6]
Disability 10.5 10.9 -0.4 [-2.6, 1.7] -0.8 [-3.6, 1.9]
Sick leave 7.8 7.0 0.8 [-1.0, 2.6] 1.6 [-1.0, 4.1]
Unemployment 9.1 4.2 4.9 [3.1, 6.6] -1.3 [-3.7, 1.1]
Other 7.4 11.1 -3.6 [-5.6, -1.6] -6.7 [-9.4, -3.9]
ER 0.0 0.0
Work and ER 0.0 0.0
II. Age 66 1
2
Work 11.3 34.7 -23.4 [-26.2, -20.7] -13.9 [-17.7, -10.1]
Disability 20.0 28.4 -8.3 [-11.3, -5.4] -9.2 [-13.1, -5.4]
Sick leave 2.3 4.6 -2.3 [-3.5, -1.0] -0.9 [-2.6, 0.9]
Unemployment 8.1 8.1 0.0 [-1.9, 1.9] -4.4 [-7.0, -1.8]
Other 8.8 15.0 -6.2 [-8.4, -4.0] -13.3 [-16.2, -10.3]
ER 46.0 8.4 37.6 [34.8, 40.5] 38.8 [34.9, 42.8]
Work and ER 3.4 0.8 2.6 [1.6, 3.6] 2.9 [1.4, 4.3]
Observations 1732 1488
95% conﬁdence intervals in brackets. The “ATEs under no selection” are ˆˆγkt from equation (5),
while “ATEs under selection on observables” refers to γˆkt from equation (6), for t = {63, 66.5}.
a Included controls are years of experience, days on sick leave during 1992, a dummy for receipt
of unemployment beneﬁts in 1992, and dummies for full time work, educational attainment,
gender, industry, geographical location and ﬁrm size (1993).
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Table 4: ATEs of ER aﬃliation for private sector workers with age limit 62
Observed (%) ATEs under ATEs under
ER No ER no selection selection on observablesa
I. Age 63
Work 31.0 59.9 -28.8 [-32.1, -25.6] -19.7 [-24.2, -15.2]
Disability 12.1 15.0 -2.9 [-5.2, -0.6] -3.8 [-6.8, -0.8]
Sick leave 3.0 8.2 -5.1 [-6.6, -3.7] -4.0 [-6.1, -1.9]
Unemployment 0.8 2.3 -1.5 [-2.3,-0.7] -0.3 [-1.4, 0.8]
Other 5.8 10.9 -5.1 [-6.9, -3.3] -9.9 [-12.4, -7.4]
ER 39.1 2.6 36.4 [33.7, 39.1] 28.5 [24.7, 32.3]
Work and ER 8.2 1.1 7.2 [5.6, 8.7] 9.3 [7.1, 11.4]
II. Age 66 1
2
Work 8.9 33.6 -24.6 [-27.1, -22.1] -19.5 [-23.0, -16.0]
Disability 16.4 31.0 -14.5 [-17.3, -11.8] -13.3 [-17.0, -9.6]
Sick leave 1.3 5.9 -4.6 [-5.7, -3.4] -4.2 [-5.8, -2.5]
Unemployment 0.8 4.6 -3.8 [-4.8,-2.9] -2.6 [-4.0,-1.2]
Other 6.6 16.7 -10.0 [-12.1, -8.0] -14.4 [-17.1, -11.6]
ER 60.7 6.6 54.1 [51.2, 56.9] 48.9 [44.9, 52.8]
Work and ER 5.2 1.6 3.6 [2.3, 4.9] 5.0 [3.2, 6.9]
Observations 2225 1323
95% conﬁdence intervals in brackets. The “ATEs under no selection” are ˆˆγkt from equation (5),
while “ATEs under selection on observables” refers to γˆkt from equation (6), for t = {63, 66.5}.
a Included controls are years of experience, days on sick leave during 1996, a dummy for receipt
of unemployment beneﬁts in 1996, and dummies for full time work, educational attainment,
gender, industry, geographical location and ﬁrm size (1997).
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6 The impacts of diﬀerent lower age limits
6.1 Partial ATEs of early retirement eligibility
In this section we will see how diﬀerent lower age limits aﬀect labour market
outcomes for ER aﬃliated elderly workers. First, we estimate equation (5) and
(6) with the treatment indicator Di replaced by δi, which takes the value 1 if
individual i has age limit 62, on a sample consisting of aﬃliated workers from
the two sub-samples described in Section 4. Estimations are run separately
for private and public sector workers. By comparing aﬃliated workers only,
one avoids problems related to selection into ER aﬃliated ﬁrms, at the cost
of some external validity.12 The treatment indicator is now a function of year
of birth only, which is arguably exogenously determined from each individual’s
point of view. Hence, there is no need to worry about non-randomness of the
treatment indicator in this particular setting. Comparing individuals of diﬀerent
birth cohorts makes room for another source of bias, however, namely that any
estimated diﬀerences in labour market outcomes between the cohorts might be
contaminated by diﬀerent labour market conditions. We will return to this issue
below.
Figure 6 and 7 show ATEs under no selection for the outcomes ’work’, ’disab-
ility’, ’sickness leave’, ’unemployment’ and ’other’, for private and public sector
workers, respectively. Starting with the outcome ’work’, the diﬀerence ranges
from about -20 percentage points to about -40 percentage points between age 62
and 64. From age 64.5 the diﬀerence is reduced, but the cohort with age limit
64 remains more likely to be working than the cohort with age limit 62 also after
the lower age limit is reached for the older cohort (at 64 years). Private sector
workers with age limit 64 are also more likely to receive unemployment beneﬁts,
and slightly more likely to receive disability pensions as of age 65 than are those
with age limit 62, whereas public sector workers with age limit 64 are less likely
to receive such pensions between age 61 and 64 than those with age limit 62.
For both private and public sector workers, we note that those with age limit 62
are more likely than workers with age limit 64 to be on long-term sickness leave
until they reach the lower age limit, while the diﬀerence turns negative around
age 62. This may well reﬂect a response to the incentives provided by the ER
scheme to remain in the labour market until the lower age limit is reached. The
state ’other’ is generally more populated for those with age limit 64.
Table 5 ﬁrst gives the observed outcomes at age 63 for the two birth cohorts
12This statement is true only if the selection of workers into ER aﬃliated ﬁrms, that is, into
ﬁrms taking part in the central tariﬀ agreements, has been constant over time. According
to Nergaard and Stokke (2010), there were only minor ﬂuctuations in the share of employees
working in ﬁrms covered by the central tariﬀ agreements from the 1960s and until the late
1990s.
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Figure 6: ATEs under no selection from OLS on equation (5) with δi = 1 if age limit
= 62. Private sector workers at diﬀerent ages.
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Figure 7: ATEs under no selection from OLS on equation (5) with δi = 1 if age limit
= 62. Public sector workers at diﬀerent ages.
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and then compares the ATEs under no selection to ATEs under selection on
observables, where the covariates in X are the same as those in Section 5.2
(namely years of experience, days on sick leave and receipt of unemployment
beneﬁts during the year prior to the base year (1992/1996), and dummies for full
time work, educational attainment, gender, industry, geographical location and
ﬁrm size (base year)). There are only minor changes in the estimated ATEs of
age limit 62 on the propensities to be in each of the four states when covariates
are added. The total substitution from other exit routes now adds up to -12
and -4 percentage points for private and public sector workers, respectively.
Table 5: ATEs of age limit 62 on outcomes at 63
Observed (%) Estimated ATEs (%)
62 64 No selection Selection on observablesa
Private sector workers
Work 31.0 65.1 -34.1 [-37.1,-31.2] -34.6 [-37.7,-31.5]
Disability 12.1 10.5 1.6 [-0.4,3.6] 1.2 [-0.8,3.2]
Sick leave 3.0 7.8 -4.8 [-6.2,-3.4] -3.8 [-5.4,-2.3]
Unemployment 0.8 9.1 -8.3 [-9.6,-7.0] -7.6 [-9.0,-6.2]
Other 5.8 7.4 -1.6 [-3.2,-0.1] -1.7 [-3.3,-0.1]
ER 39.1 0.0
Work and ER 8.2 0.0
Observations 2225 1732
Public sector workers
Work 37.4 68.1 -30.7 [-33.1,-28.4] -29.5 [-31.9,-27.1]
Disability 14.8 11.2 3.6 [2.0,5.3] 3.5 [1.8,5.1]
Sick leave 5.9 5.8 0.1 [-1.1,1.2] 0.4 [-0.8,1.6]
Unemployment 0.2 0.2 -0.1 [-0.3,0.1] -0.2 [-0.4,0.0]
Other 7.0 14.6 -7.6 [-9.1,-6.0] -7.7 [-9.3,-6.2]
ER 20.4 0.0
Work and ER 14.3 0.0
Observations 3183 3068
95% conﬁdence intervals in brackets. The ﬁrst two columns give observed relative frequencies
for the cohorts with age limit 62 and 64, respectively. The unweighted diﬀerences are ˆˆγkt
from equation (5), while “OLS w/controls” refers to γˆkt from equation (6), for t = 63, and
with the treatment indicator δi = 1 for individuals with age limit 62.
a Included controls are years of experience, days on sick leave during 1992, a dummy for receipt
of unemployment beneﬁts in 1992, and dummies for full time work, educational attainment,
gender, geographical location, industry and ﬁrm size in 1993 (the two latter for private sector
workers only).
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To investigate whether important heterogeneities are masked by the average
treatment eﬀects, I have estimated versions of equation (6) where the treatment
indicator is interacted with each of the variables Pension points 1993/1997,
Male, Married, Hours per week ≥ 30, Educational attainment (three dummies),
and Firm size (ﬁve dummies). For private sector workers, this method reveals
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences for the outcomes ’work’ and ’other’. The positive
treatment eﬀect for the outcome ’disability’ appears to be driven by women, as
the treatment eﬀect for men is negative and non-signiﬁcant. The negative eﬀect
on the outcome ’sick leave’ is driven by individuals with low levels of education
and by workers in the smallest ﬁrms, whereas the propensity to be unemployed
decreases most for those with low levels of education and for workers in large
ﬁrms.
For public sector workers the interaction terms reveal no signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences for the outcomes ’work’ and ’unemployment’. The positive treatment
eﬀect for the outcome ’disability’ appears to be driven by those who earned
relatively few pension points the year they turned 60 (1993/1997). A lower age
limit increases the propensity to be on sickness leave for the non-married, but
not for the married, and decreases the same propensity slightly for those with
high levels of education, whereas the treatment eﬀect for the outcome ’other’ is
mostly driven by men. (Results not reported.)
6.2 Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation
It may be that the diﬀerences in Figure 6 and 7 and Table 5 are not only due to
the diﬀerent age limits; they might be biased due to the fact that the cohorts
are observed at diﬀerent times and under diﬀerent labour market conditions.
The fact that private sector workers with age limit 62 are less likely to be
unemployed than are those with age limit 64 even before they turn 62 gives a
particular reason to suspect such biases. One way of coping with these is to rely
on diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) or triple diﬀerences (DDD) strategies. Instead
of requiring that the observed outcomes at each age are inﬂuenced by the year
of birth only through the lower age limit for early retirement, the identifying
assumption for DD and DDD estimation relates to diﬀerences in outcomes over
time.
Table 6 illustrates DD and DDD estimation of the impact of a lower age limit
at 62 relative to one at 64 on the propensity to be classiﬁed as still working at
the age of 63.13 The top panel compares the change in work propensities for
aﬃliated private sector workers with age limit 62 to the change for those with
13Both the notation and the framing of the DD and DDD strategies of this section are
borrowed from Gruber (1994).
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age limit 64. There was a 52.5 percentage point fall in the propensity to work
between age 61 and 63 for workers with age limit 62, compared to only 19.3
percentage points for those with age limit 64, which constitutes a 33 percentage
points relative fall in the work propensity between age 61 and 63 among ER
aﬃliated workers. This is the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences average treatment eﬀect
estimate of a two-years reduction in the lower age limit, and its magnitude is
very close to the ATEs reported in Table 5.
The possibility of bias due to diﬀerent labour market conditions is examined
in panel B, where the same exercise as the one in panel A is performed for a
control group consisting of non-aﬃliated private sector workers. It turns out
that individuals belonging to the cohort with age limit 64 (the older cohort)
are more likely to be working at both ages than those with age limit 62 (the
younger cohort), even among the non-aﬃliated: The relative diﬀerence in work
propensities is a signiﬁcant -6.1 percentage points.
The triple diﬀerence estimate (the diﬀerence between panel A and B) is at
-27.1 percentage points, that is, there was a 27 percentage points fall in the
relative work propensities of aﬃliated workers with age limit 62, compared to
the change in relative propensities among those with age limit 64, between age
61 and 63. This estimate indicates that more than two out of three (-27.1/39.1)
ER pensioners with age limit 62 would still have been working at the age of
63 if the lower age limit was instead at 64, which corresponds to roughly twice
the magnitude of the eﬀects of increased early retirement age in Austria, as
documented by Staubli and Zweimu¨ller (2012).
One may want to investigate whether the DDD estimate in Table 6 is sens-
itive to conditioning on other observables that aﬀect the propensity to continue
working, and a way of doing so is to include a set of covariates in a regression
equation like the following:
Yijt = α+ β1Xijt + β2τt + β3δj + β4Di
+ β5 (δj × τt) + β6 (Di × τt) + β7 (Di × δj) (7)
+ β8 (Di × δj × τt) ,
where i indexes individuals, j indexes age limits (1 if age limit 62, 0 if 64),
and t indexes time/age (1 if age 63 (“after”), 0 if 61 (“before”)). Yijt equals
1 if individual i is observed working at age t, and zero otherwise, and X is a
vector of observable characteristics, δj is a ﬁxed cohort (or age limit) eﬀect, τt
is a ﬁxed age eﬀect, and Di takes the value 1 if individual i is aﬃliated with
the ER scheme, and zero otherwise. The ﬁxed eﬀects control for the eﬀects
of age (β2), time-invariant diﬀerences between the two cohorts (β3), and time-
invariant characteristics common to aﬃliated workers (β4). The second-level
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Table 6: Work propensities and DD and DDD estimates of reduced lower age limit
Before After After-Before
(Age 61) (Age 63)
A. Treatment individuals: Aﬃliated private sector workers
Age limit 62 83.5 31.0 -52.5
[2,225] [2,225] (1.3)
Age limit 64 84.4 65.1 -19.3
[1,732] [1,732] (1.4)
Diﬀ. between cohorts at same age: -0.9 -34.1
(1.2) (1.5)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences: -33.2
(1.9)
B. Control group: Non-aﬃliated private sector workers
Age limit 62 81.2 59.9 -21.3
[1,323] [1,323] (1.7)
Age limit 64 81.9 66.7 -15.2
[1,488] [1,488] (1.6)
Diﬀ. between cohorts at same age: -0.7 -6.9
(1.5) (1.8)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences: -6.1
(2.3)
Triple diﬀerence: -27.1
(3.0)
Standard errors in parentheses, number of individuals in square brackets. Observed relative
frequencies and point estimates in percentages.
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interactions control for changes over time for the cohort with age limit 62 (β5),
changes over time for aﬃliated workers (β6), and time-invariant characteristics
common to aﬃliated workers with age limit 62 (β7). The third level interaction
(β8) captures all variation in the work propensity speciﬁc to aﬃliated workers
(relative to non-aﬃliated) with age limit 62 (relative to those with age limit 64)
at age 63 (relative to age 61). This is the DDD estimator of age limit 62 on the
propensity to be working at age 63. Neither the DD nor the DDD estimates
were altered in any signiﬁcant way when the same individual characteristics as
those in Table 5 were included in X .
Although the estimates in Table 6 are robust with respect to the inclusion of
controls, they will for the same reasons as in Section 5.2 be subject to contamin-
ation bias. Following the same logic as above we compute that 3.7/0.473 = 7.8
percent of the workers with age limit 62 classiﬁed as non-aﬃliated were actually
eligible at the age of 63 (numbers taken from Table 4). Dividing the estimated
propensity to work at the age of 63 for non-aﬃliated workers with age limit 62
by the estimated fraction of non-aﬃliated workers, we arrive at an adjusted es-
timate of 59.9/(1− 0.078) = 65.0. The DD estimate in panel B is thus reduced
to -1.0 and the DDD estimate increases in magnitude to -32.2, which would
imply that more than four out of ﬁve (32.2/39.1) of the ER pensioners would
still have been working at the age of 63 had the age limit been 64 rather than
62.
Both unadjusted and adjusted DD and DDD estimates of age limit 62 on
the propensity to be in each of the ﬁve outcome states are given in Table 7. We
note that the DDD estimates are generally very close to the treatment eﬀects
reported in Table 5.
Figure 8 shows nation-wide unemployment rates along with lower age lim-
its for ER aﬃliated workers, and how unemployment was higher in 1994 (5.2
percent) and 1996 (4.2 percent), when the outcomes of the older cohort are ob-
served, than in 1998 (2.4 percent) and 2000 (2.7 percent), when the outcomes
of the younger cohort are observed. In Table 6 and 7 we saw how individuals in
the older cohort are more likely to be working than those in the younger cohort,
also among the non-aﬃliated. This may be taken as an indication that norms
regarding what is an acceptable or normal retirement age have changed as the
ER programme has become more settled. The link between beneﬁt eligibility
ages and social norms for retirement is also put forward by Gruber and Wise
(2004), along with limited private saving and liquidity constraints, as a pos-
sible explanation for the widely observed spikes in retirement rates at beneﬁt
eligibility ages.
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Table 7: DD and DDD estimates of age limit 62 on outcomes at age 63
DD DDD
ER No ER
A. Unadjusted eﬀects (%)
Work -33.2 (1.9) -6.1 (2.3) -27.1 (3.0)
Disability 0.7 (1.2) 2.8 (1.4) -2.1 (1.8)
Sick leave -6.4 (1.1) 0.5 (1.3) -6.8 (1.7)
Unemployment -5.9 (0.8) 0.7 (0.9) -6.6 (1.2)
Other -2.5 (1.1) -1.5 (1.3) -0.9 (1.7)
B. Adjusted eﬀects (%)
Work -33.2 -1.0 -32.2
Disability 0.7 4.1 -3.4
Sick leave -6.4 1.2 -7.6
Unemployment -5.9 0.9 -6.8
Other -2.5 -0.6 -1.9
Standard errors in parentheses. The adjusted eﬀects in panel B are
point estimates adjusted for contamination bias as described in the
text.
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Figure 8: Register based unemployment rates from the Norwegian Labour and
Welfare Administration (NAV) along with lower age limits for ER aﬃliated
workers. Green (brown) lines indicate before and after for the “old” (“young”)
cohort.
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7 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to estimate causal eﬀects of the early re-
tirement programme AFP on labour market outcomes among elderly workers,
including induced retirement eﬀects and substitution from other exit routes.
We have seen that diﬀerences between public and private sector workers, in
terms of observed characteristics and retirement behaviour, makes a good case
for making separate analyses for the two groups, which has typically not been
done in earlier studies of this topic. Moreover, we have found indications that
estimates based on comparisons between workers in aﬃliated and non-aﬃliated
ﬁrms and relying on the conditional independence assumption may be subject
to selection bias. Nevertheless, average treatment eﬀects indicate that at least
one out of three ER pensioners would still be working at the age of 66.5 if early
retirement was not an option, and this magnitude is almost identical for two
cohorts faced with diﬀerent lower age limits. The results also indicate rather
substantial substitution from disability pensions. Exploiting a reduction in the
lower age limit as a source of exogenous variation in individual eligibility we
have obtained robust diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences and triple diﬀerences estimates
indicating that more than two out of three ER pensioners would be working at
the age of 63 had the age limit been 64 rather than 62.
Although previous trends towards early retirement appear to have come to
an end in many industrialised countries, the ﬁnancial sustainability of public
pension systems is still under pressure due to rapid increases in life expectancy.
Policy reforms intended to increase labour force participation among elderly
workers are thus likely to be called for also in the years to come. The magnitude
of the average treatment eﬀects reported in this paper clearly suggest that there
may be much to gain in terms of increased labour supply from restricting access
to early retirement schemes.
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A Appendix: Technical details
A.1 On the classiﬁcation of workers into labour force states
The following procedure is used for the classiﬁcation of individuals into one
of the seven labour force states (work, part-time work and ER beneﬁts, ER,
disability, long term sick leave, unemployment, and ’other’) at each age for those
registered with more than one type of beneﬁts: ER pensions are given priority
over disability beneﬁts, and disability beneﬁts over sick leave and unemployment
beneﬁts, and only those who did not receive either of these beneﬁts may be
classiﬁed into the state ’work’. An individual is classiﬁed into the state ’part-
time work and ER beneﬁts’ if she received ER pensions the relevant month,
had at least one employment record with termination date after the relevant
month, and had an annualized wage exceeding 2BA. Finally, those not registered
as beneﬁt recipients and for whom no active employment record is found for
the relevant month are classiﬁed into the state ’other’, which would include
individuals retired through private ﬁrm-provided retirement schemes or public
sector early retirement schemes other than AFP, self-employed, and individuals
out of the labour force for other reasons.
A.2 On the classiﬁcation of ﬁrms according to ER aﬃli-
ation
There is no direct information on ER aﬃliation at the ﬁrm level, and prior to
1999 there is no direct way of separating private from public sector ﬁrms. To get
around these limitations, I have identiﬁed all recipients of public and private ER
pension beneﬁts and tried to track down the last job prior to pension take-up
for each of these individuals. As a general rule, a ﬁrm is classiﬁed as public if at
least one of its former employees received public ER pensions. In the relatively
few cases where the same ﬁrm has some former employees receiving public ER
beneﬁts and some receiving private ER beneﬁts, the ﬁrm is classiﬁed as public
if the number of public ER beneﬁts recipients exceed the number of private
ER beneﬁt recipients and the ﬁrst take-up of public ER beneﬁts was prior to
the ﬁrst take-up of private ER beneﬁts, or if the number of private ER beneﬁts
recipients is very small compared to the number of public ER beneﬁts recipients.
A private sector ﬁrm is classiﬁed as ER aﬃliated in the base year (1993/1997)
if the ﬁrst take-up of private ER beneﬁts of a former employee happened within
the ﬁrst ﬁve years after the base year.
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